Unlike the threat of broad-based tariffs on all imports, there is recent historical precedence for U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum products. Indeed, the latest tariff threat is a direct extension of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act used to implement steel and aluminum tariffs in 2018/19, but aluminum tariffs have been bumped up from 10% in that earlier period to 25%.
The broader worry is that international trade uncertainty is not going away. As we discussed here, U.S. trade policy is likely to remain a significant source of uncertainty for the industrial sector with negative implications for business investment in Canada and on medium term productivity growth. Even with the ambiguity of trade relations going forward, here’s what we think the implications of U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs are on Canada.
Using the specific product list the U.S. targeted with tariffs in 2018/19, the U.S. accounts for over 90% of Canadian steel and aluminum exports. By our count, the renewal of the tariffs from 2018/19 would apply to roughly $24 billion of Canadian exports.
But that sensitivity runs both ways. Canada is the largest U.S. import market, worth US$ 7.5 billion in steel and $9.4 billion in aluminum products in 2024. Canada accounts for about a fifth of U.S. imports of steel and 50% of aluminum imports.
Moreover, Canada and U.S. steel trade is relatively balanced. Canada is the second largest export market for U.S. steel products, but is a larger net exporter of aluminum to the U.S. Canada’s total 2024 trade balance in steel and aluminum products (those targeted with tariffs) was $14 billion, with $11 billion from the aluminum trade.
The tariffs being imposed are significant, and will have implications for the Canadian steel and aluminum sectors, but as we noted in our tariff playbook, size matters when it comes to assessing the broader economic impact of tariff increases. Steel and aluminum together account for just about 0.5% of Canadian gross domestic product and jobs, and about 3% of Canadian exports. Quebec and Ontario are the most exposed provinces where these industries represent 1% and 0.6% of GDP, respectively.
For directly impacted industries, the next step in thinking through the impact of tariffs is to consider how easy it is for importers to find alternative import markets. The 2018/19 tariff spat over steel and aluminum showed substituting to alternative suppliers or products was very difficult, leaving U.S. importers with little choice but to pay higher costs.
Most other suppliers of U.S. steel will also be subject to higher tariffs, and it’s very difficult for U.S. producers to increase production capacity quickly. Specific steel and aluminum products can also be highly specialized, and difficult to substitute.
U.S. imports of steel products targeted with 25% tariffs actually rose in 2018, and the share coming from Europe, Canada, and Mexico increased slightly. Canadian employment in steel and aluminum product industries rose by almost 4% in 2018 and another 6% in 2019. U.S. steel and aluminum production capacity actually declined over the period that tariffs were in place on the largest U.S. import markets.
We argued in 2018/19 that the broader cost of targeted tariff increases, like those being imposed on steel and aluminum products, is that it increases uncertainty, weighing on business investment. That is still true today.
But Canadian investment is in a substantially worse shape now than it was then after being hit by a global pandemic, followed by an underperforming economy over the last two years. Weaker business investment threatens to extend a long run of productivity underperformance, and ultimately, weaker Canadian worker wages compared to other parts of the world.
Read the full article by Nathan Janzen / Royal Bank of Canada
